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CONTRIBUTION SEQUENCES IN THRESHOLD PUBLIC GOODS
1. Introduction
As “[s]ome of the most fundamental questions about the organization of society center
around issues raised by the presence of public goods” (Ledyard, 1995, p.112), public
goods games are among the most studied topics in experimental economics in the lab
as well as in the field. Indeed, the plethora of studies in economics and neighboring
disciplines like sociology, political science, or psychology reflects the variety of situations
characterized by the social dilemma inherent in public goods provision: the free-rider
problem. The reason for the persistent interest stems from the fact that abstract features
of the game serve as a metaphor for many economic situations spanning from defense,
public infrastructure, or health to more specific problems in organizational economics
like intellectual property rights or team production (Ledyard, 1995).
The leading paradigm in most of this literature has been to focus on final outcomes,
which is why the public goods situation is mostly modeled as a simultaneous-move
game. Within this general framework, a variety of adaptions have been suggested to
solve the free-rider problem. A non-exhaustive list of those variations includes partner
design, communication, monetary and non-monetary punishment, or heterogeneous
endowments (Chaudhuri, 2011; Zelmer, 2003). While these approaches often alleviate
the free-rider problem and facilitate cooperation, some of the most interesting public
goods in social and organizational reality have a different temporal structure: processes
like team work in organizations or fund raisers have a real-time aspect instead of simul-
taneous contributions.
In arguing that it is crucial to focus on the process of public goods provision instead of
final outcomes, our study contributes to several strands of literature. First, in amelio-
rating the free-rider problem, some experimental public goods studies have started to
deviate from the simultaneous-move setup and introduced the real-time protocol. How-
ever, relatively few studies employed this mechanism, reporting mixed results – while
public goods implementation is enhanced in some studies, others fail to find this effect
(Dorsey, 1992; Goren et al., 2003; Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Oprea et al., 2014).
Second, there has been a growing interest in looking at the effects of (endogenous)
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leadership (Dannenberg, 2015; Potters et al., 2005, 2007; Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Sut-
ter et al., 2010). These studies are concerned with exploring if and why individuals
volunteer to make the first move (i.e., leading by example without formal authority),
finding that while having individuals volunteering to go first increases implementation
success, few individuals are willing to do so. However, little is known about the theoret-
ical rationale to explain an individual’s position in the resulting contribution sequence.
Our point of departure is that we are explicitly interested in those sequences. Thus, we
contribute to the literature on the real-time protocol by examining the effect of visible
contributions while not only focusing on the ultimate result, that is, the implementa-
tion of the public good, but also on the process leading to it. We contribute to the
literature on endogenous leadership by exploring who volunteers to go first in a richer
setup where contribution sequences are endogenous.
Third, while economic theory is silent concerning those contribution sequences, the
focus on the role of heterogeneous tendencies to participate in collective action has
long been discussed in sociological theories of collective behavior (Oliver, 1993). For
our purpose, we draw on a specific model, referred to as threshold theory (Granovet-
ter, 1978; Granovetter and Soong, 1983). This theory delivers utility-based arguments
why some individuals tend towards earlier and others towards later decisions. In fact,
Braun (1994) attributes individual threshold heterogeneity to differences in behavioral
determinants. While he mainly focuses on the benefits, costs, and network properties
of the decision context, individual differences are neglected (Braun, 1995; Watts and
Dodds, 2011). The present study aims at closing this gap between sociological theories
of collective behavior and economic experiments by investigating the role of individual
differences in endogenous contribution sequences in a real-time public goods context.
Fourth and related, we also add to the literature investigating how individual differ-
ences influence behavior in public goods situations. More specifically, several studies
have investigated how heterogeneity in personality (Hilbig et al., 2014, 2012; Zhao and
Smillie, 2015), distributional preferences (Balliet et al., 2009; Dijkstra, 2013; Murphy
and Ackermann, 2014), or risk aversion (Fung et al., 2012; Teyssier, 2012) affect con-
tribution decisions. We build on and extend these studies by measuring participants’
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personality traits and distributional preferences and relating them to individual hetero-
geneity in contribution behavior in the real-time public goods game.
Thus, we employ a simple provision-point mechanism in the laboratory and use the real-
time protocol; that is, participants do not make decisions simultaneously, but are able
to freely decide when to make their choice within a given time frame. This way, we are
able to examine the effect of having information about others’ actions on the one hand
while being able to identify individual differences in behavior in these real-time public
goods situations and relate them to personality traits and economic preferences on the
other hand. Indeed, we are able to show that if we provide information about others’
behavior in real time, implementation of the public good is facilitated, at least when
the target is sufficiently difficult to reach. In addition, we find endogenous contribution
sequences, i.e., individuals reacting to real-time information about their fellow group
members. While distributional preferences alone explain participation decisions, the
sequencing of contributions is influenced by a broader array of individual differences.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss related literature by elab-
orating on how individual timing and individual differences are intertwined. Second,
we explain both the laboratory design and procedure. After having presented our main
experimental results, we discuss their relevance in light of potential limitations. Finally,
we conclude.
2. Related Literature
The conflict between individual and collective rationality has drawn the attention of
various research disciplines. Sociologists have long been interested in the formation of
collective behavior, such as social movements (Smelser, 1963; Udéhn, 1993), psycholo-
gists have been studying helping and organizational citizenship behavior (Organ, 1994;
Smith et al., 1983) as well as various forms of mixed-motive social dilemmas (Dawes,
1980; Komorita and Parks, 1995; Lange et al., 2013), and economists have been ex-
amining different versions of inter-individual coordination or behavioral cascades (An-
derson and Holt, 1997; Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995).
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Despite important differences, these approaches all tackle the problem of interpersonal
coordination and the conflict between individual and collective rationality (Dawes and
Messick, 2000; Kollock, 1998).
Apart from the more general examples mentioned above, specific applications to or-
ganizational reality have been discussed, arguing that “in fostering cooperation among
employees, managers usually face a public good dilemma” (Bridoux et al., 2011, p.711).
Relevant phenomena of organizational behavior and work group productivity, such as
strategic initiatives (Lechner and Kreutzer, 2011) or organizational task forces (Ger-
sick, 1988), closely resemble those social dilemmas for three reasons. First, strategic
initiatives and organizational task forces evolve along a collective sequence made up of
individual contribution decisions and both require concerted voluntary efforts of the in-
dividuals involved, while not allowing for perfect observability of individual behaviors
without incurring high monitoring costs (Goren et al., 2003). Second and related, due
to their highly interdependent nature, it may be hard to exclude any individual from
enjoying the (long-term) benefits of the public good, while the short-term costs are only
incurred by the cooperating individuals (Bridoux et al., 2011; Lechner and Kreutzer,
2011). Third, their success typically increases with the investments of time and effort
by their members and they are of temporary nature, which means that they typically
have to be successfully accomplished until a certain deadline, or else fail.
In the following paragraphs we will develop two distinct, yet related sets of hypothe-
ses. First, we will discern how institutional changes influence public goods provision.
Second, we derive a set of hypotheses to explain endogenous contribution sequences.
2.1. The Influence of Institutional Changes on Public Goods Provision
Abstract versions of these phenomena described above have been implemented in the
experimental laboratory. In standard experimental public goods contexts, the voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM) has emerged as the dominant way of representing pub-
lic goods provision in experimental studies in economics and psychology (Chaudhuri,
2011; Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003). Under the VCM, all individuals voluntarily decide
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to either invest resources in the public account or to keep them in their private account.
Afterwards, all investments to the public account are multiplied by a given factor and
distributed among all individuals, including the defectors. Hence, in this simple game,
keeping all resources in the private account is the individually dominant strategy, while
investing everything in the public account is socially optimal. It has been shown that,
on average, contribution rates under the VCM are between 40% and 60% of the so-
cial optimum, while contributions tend to decrease over repeated periods of the game
(Chaudhuri, 2011; Goren et al., 2003).
As already pointed out in the previous section, to alleviate this prevalent free-rider
problem, several institutional solutions have been proposed. While several variants of
the standard VCM have been discussed in that regard, the provision point mechanism
(PPM) is of particular interest for studying public goods because it is more comparable
to organizational reality, keeping in mind the above-described strategic initiatives and
organizational task forces. We argue that using the PPM enhances both mundane and
experimental realism because it differs from the VCM in two notable features (Abele
et al., 2010; Croson and Marks, 1998; Marks and Croson, 1999).1 First, the public good
is not provided unless a given threshold t of contributions is reached (i.e., for a project
to be conducted, a certain number of people need to participate). Second, while under
the VCM contributions to the public account are typically continuously divisible, the
PPM mostly employs all-or-nothing contributions (i.e., team members either participate
in a proposed project or not). More specifically, under the PPM, participants play in
groups of n players where every player has an endowment of E units. Subsequently,
the players choose a contribution level ci ∈ {0; 1}. If t or more players choose to invest
their endowment in the public account, the public good of value G is provided and
every group member receives a reward of G
n
units. Additional contributions do not
further increase the value G. If t is not reached, the public good is not provided and the
contributors lose their investment to the public account. Non-contributors keep their
initial endowment in both cases. Thus, in adding a contribution target to be reached, a
1 While the former aims at resembling the real world in an experimental investigation, the latter
is concerned with how well the experimental situation captures the theoretical constructs under
scrutiny (Colquitt, 2008). Most often critique of experimental settings is targeted at low mundane
realism, while experimental realism should be the focus of attention (Highhouse, 2009).
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coordination problem arises. Typically, all parameters of the game (n, t, G, and c) are
common knowledge.
However, there are also two notable differences from a game theoretic perspective.
First, in comparison to the VCM, there is not just a single Nash equilibrium for con-
tributing nothing, but additional equilibria for exactly t players contributing exist. Sec-
ond, while in the continuous form everyone contributing is the Pareto efficient solution,
the second Nash equilibrium where everybody is keeping their endowment is not. In
the step-level form, any coordination solution that reaches the provision point is Pareto
efficient (Abele et al., 2010). Consequently, under the PPM, contribution behavior has
been shown to be much more rugged in comparison to the VCM: while overall efficiency
and total contributions are increased, it is found to be more susceptible to changes in
induced value (Rondeau et al., 2005). In addition, contributions do not always decrease
over repeated periods of the game (Abele et al., 2010).
One important driver of contribution decisions to public goods is the value of the pub-
lic good relative to that of the forgone private good, which has been formalized as
marginal per-capita return and demonstrated to influence the provision of linear public
goods. A comparable feature of threshold games is the step return. Empirical results
show that comparing the step returns between games yields comparable results to uti-
lizing the marginal per capita return under the VCM: a higher step return encourages
contributions (Croson and Marks, 2000). As the step return increases in t, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Implementation rates are lower when the provision point is increased.
Moreover, while most public goods experiments have been conducted under the simul-
taneous protocol of play where decisions are made simultaneously, anonymously and
in private (Chaudhuri, 2011), this does not resemble strategic initiatives and organiza-
tional task forces very well. This because in organizations, individuals normally possess
at least partial information about the decisions of other group members and consider
this information before making their own decisions. As an alternative, the real-time
protocol is better suited to capture the inherent decision sequence of endogenous in-
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dividual timing present in organizations. Until now, comparably few studies employed
this mechanism under the VCM and the PPM. Using the real-time protocol, the differ-
ences between coordination and cooperation are unclear and multiple equilibria exist,
which raises the question whether participants are able to coordinate efficiently or not
(Abele et al., 2010; Oprea et al., 2014). While most studies find enhanced implementa-
tion rates, others fail to find this effect (Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 2001; Dorsey, 1992;
Goren et al., 2003, 2004; Kurzban et al., 2001). Those empirical inconsistencies are due
to two reasons: First, the results stem from different games, thereby inhibiting compa-
rability. Second, while most studies on coordination use revocable investments to the
public account (e.g., Leng et al., 2016), we employ irrevocable commitments to avoid
cheap talk (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). Theoretically, it has been argued that continuous
games approximate an array of discrete games with the grid length going to zero (Si-
mon and Stinchcombe, 1989). Thus, this form of repeated interaction should increase
cooperation.2 Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Implementation rates are lower when individuals have no information
about others’ behaviors.
However, behavior is not only driven by institutional arrangements or incentives, but
also by individual heterogeneity. Albeit being unified in these central building blocks
underlying behavior formation, economists and psychologists differ with regard to how
this heterogeneity is conceptualized. While psychologists use the different facets of
personality (Rabin, 1998; Rustichini, 2009), economists rely on using heterogeneity in
stable and exogenous preferences like risk or time, and have long been skeptical about
the usefulness of those personality dimensions. Albeit they have long questioned their
stability, extant research suggests that these qualms are uncalled-for (Almlund et al.,
2011). Indeed, it has been shown that personality could be a worthwhile adjunct to
experimental measures of economic preferences in increasing predictive power (Rusti-
chini et al., 2012) and are thus complementary (Becker et al., 2012). Adding to that
2 Theoretical predictions are difficult at this point because extant reasoning in economics does not
allow for clear-cut hypotheses. However, following social interdependence theory (Abele et al., 2010;
Kelley and Thibaut, 1978), one can argue that if participants are missing any form of information
used to infer the behavior of others, coordination failure is more likely (Puranam et al., 2012).
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literature, we argue that while the pertinent situation is a substantial influencing fac-
tor for behavior formation, another focus of our paper is on predicting contribution
sequencing using individual differences, which will be elaborated on in the following.
2.2. Explaining Endogenous Contribution Sequences
There has been substantial research to predict public goods contributions under the
VCM using individual differences, which can be either distal or proximal to overt be-
havior (Kanfer and Ackerman, 1989). While the former include broad factors, such as
general personality structure (Hilbig et al., 2014; Hilbig and Zettler, 2009), the latter
comprises more specific determinants of behavior like social value orientation (SVO)
(Murphy et al., 2011) or risk preferences (Fung et al., 2012). As mentioned before,
the game-theoretic predictions are fundamentally different under the PPM, yielding
two types of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and thus a coordination problem to solve.
Hence, the role of determining factors is less clear and evidence is scarcer. While us-
ing the real-time protocol of play should mitigate coordination failure, the availability
of real-time information about contributors adds an additional strategic dimension to
the game: moving early can be used to signal a cooperative social norm, but waiting
for others to move first and updating beliefs about the probability of implementation
with and without one’s own contribution on a rolling basis is also possible. In contrast,
without real-time information about contributions available, subjects have no way of
updating beliefs and less need to behave strategically, i.e., based on what others are do-
ing. In essence, all group members base their decision on less information and thus take
less time to choose whether to contribute or not. Therefore, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The time to contribute is shorter when individuals have no information
about others’ decisions.
In the case of symmetric agents, successful coordination is a stochastic process, as it
is unknown ex ante which people are going to contribute and at which position in the
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behavioral sequence (Au and Budescu, 1999). While the role of asymmetric agents un-
der the VCM has been studied extensively (e.g., Reuben and Riedl, 2013), economic and
game-theoretic reasoning has mostly treated this kind of variance in coordination games
as noise (Mäs and Nax, 2016). As such, differential effects of individual heterogeneity
on coordination have only seldom been studied (e.g., Diekmann and Przepiorka, 2016).
However, in sociology and psychology, there exists a broad range of theories specifically
concerned with these processes. Specific variants of such models of collective behavior,
such as bandwagon or hazard models, are often used to conduct research on conformity
behavior, behavioral contagion, or on diffusion of innovation in a business setting (Cen-
tola and Macy, 2007; Oliver, 1993). In psychology and sociology, it is often assumed
that individuals prefer social conformity, equality, or identity affirmation (Ashforth and
Mael, 1989; Simon et al., 2008; Simpson, 2006), while in economics and economic
sociology, the underlying assumption is that information is derived from behavior of
(relevant) others (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Bikhchandani et al., 1998). While those
accounts differ with regard to the driving force behind social interdependence, they are
unified by their basic tenet of proposing that the uptake of beliefs or the adoption of
an innovation depends on other people’s behavior. Therefore, we posit the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. There is a cascading process in contribution decisions.
A specific specimen of the broad family of theories described above is the threshold
model of collective behavior (Granovetter, 1978; Granovetter and Soong, 1983). Here,
individual heterogeneity in contribution timing is assumed to manifest as a behavioral
threshold which is defined as “the number or proportion of others who must make one
decision before a given actor does” (Granovetter, 1978, p.1420). As shown in Figure 1,
some individuals actively contribute very early in the process (i.e., instigators, dotted
circles), others may wait and see whether or not any collective movement begins to
form (i.e., moderates, striped circles), while again others may need to see a lot of other
individuals acting before contributing (i.e., reluctant, filled circles). Broadly speaking,
an individual’s behavioral threshold represents that person’s behavioral tendency to
participate in a collective action.
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While the original model suggests that thresholds are solely based on cost-benefit cal-
culations and availability of information, it has been pointed out that individual dif-
ferences also drive threshold formation. This way, individuals are assumed to differ
in their behavioral tendency to cooperate because of heterogeneous personality factors,
diverse ideologies or beliefs, varying economic motives as well as differing susceptibility
to conformism. In the context of this paper, we focus on personality factors, as various
studies have related personality to public goods contributions as well as to a broad range
of work- and non-work-related attitudes and behaviors (cf. Ozer and Benet-Martînez,
2006). While the so called five-factor model has emerged as the most widely used
model of personality (Barrick and Mount, 2012), the HEXACO model is more suitable
for research on social dilemmas (Hilbig and Zettler, 2009; Ross et al., 2003) as it clearly
distinguishes the domains of honesty and agreeableness. This reflects an intensive de-
bate in personality psychology whether the five-factor model should be complemented
with a sixth factor capturing honesty or integrity (Hough et al., 2015). While this gen-
eral issue has not been fully resolved yet, this distinction is important for the present
study because it enables disentanglement of active (i.e., honesty in HEXACO) and re-
active cooperation (i.e., agreeableness in HEXACO), both captured by agreeableness in
the five-factor model (Hilbig et al., 2014). Individuals with a tendency for active coop-
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eration are likely to contribute earlier, whereas individuals with a tendency for reactive
cooperation are likely to contribute later because of their rather responsive nature.
Honesty. Honesty “represents the tendency to be fair and genuine with others, in the
sense of cooperating with others” (Ashton and Lee, 2007, p.156). Empirical evidence
shows that honesty is positively related to prosocial behavior, for instance in dictator
(Hilbig et al., 2014; Hilbig and Zettler, 2009) and public goods games (Hilbig et al.,
2012). More specifically, honest individuals are prone to cooperate early when the
decision timing is left to their choice (Hilbig et al., 2013b). Therefore, we propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Honest individuals contribute earlier in the contribution sequence.
Emotionality. Emotionality is typically described as being “vulnerable, sensitive and
anxious”, while individuals scoring low on this trait are rather “fearless, tough, inde-
pendent, and unemotional” (Ashton et al., 2014, p.140). Thus, it is linked to empathy
and attachment (Hilbig et al., 2013a). As empirical investigations have found a nega-
tive link between emotionality and contributions in a public goods context (Clark et al.,
2014; Hilbig et al., 2012), we propose:
Hypothesis 6. Emotional individuals contribute later in the contribution sequence.
Extraversion. Also belonging to the proactivity domain, extraverted individuals show
proactive behaviors and have been described as being outgoing, lively, sociable, talkative,
cheerful and active (Ashton and Lee, 2007). Empirical investigations yielded mixed re-
sults regarding extraversion and behavior in social dilemmas, which has been attributed
to divergent theoretical linkages of social dominance and sociability. While the former
is likely to foster free riding (Zhao and Smillie, 2015), the latter suggests that extraver-
sion enhances contributions to the public good (Clark et al., 2014; Hilbig et al., 2012).
As extraversion has also been found to increase proactive behavior (Onyemah, 2008)
and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) (Bourdage et al., 2012), we propose:
Hypothesis 7. Extraverted individuals contribute earlier in the contribution sequence.
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Agreeableness. In the HEXACO model, agreeableness is linked to traits like toler-
ance and forgiveness even in the face of being exploited (Ashton and Lee, 2007), as
well as flexibility and patience (Ashton et al., 2014). While agreeable individuals are
also inclined to cooperate, it is a rather reactive form of cooperation (Hilbig et al.,
2012, 2013a; Zhao and Smillie, 2015). Empirical research supports this differentiation,
since agreeableness was positively related to reactive cooperative behavior in ultimatum
games and only weakly related to active cooperation (Hilbig et al., 2013a). Therefore,
we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8. Agreeable individuals contribute later in the contribution sequence.
Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is seen as “[. . . ] socially prescribed impulse
control that facilitates [. . . ] thinking before acting” (John et al., 2008, p.120). Thus,
conscientious individuals often show traits, such as thoughtfulness, deliberateness, and
planning (John et al., 2008; McCrae and Costa, 1987). Tan and Tan (2008) report
a significant negative (positive) relation between conscientiousness and social loafing
(OCB). While conscientiousness has also been positively linked to individual contribu-
tions in public goods games (Clark et al., 2014; Hilbig et al., 2012), others have found
no correlations to cooperative intentions (Ross et al., 2003). Taken together, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9. Conscientious individuals contribute later in the contribution sequence.
Openness. As a trait, openness to experience depicts a person’s artistic or aesthetic
character, her curiosity, or creativity (Ashton and Lee, 2009). Due to the inherent nature
of the measurement of openness in the HEXACO model, it seems not plausible to form a
specific hypothesis. While we include openness in our analysis, this is rather exploratory.
Social Value Orientation. Apart from distal personality traits, behavioral thresholds
should also be influenced by more proximal individual preferences. Under the general
label of social preferences, heterogeneity in distributional preferences has been studied
12
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in a variety of settings in economics (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Psychologists, however,
have measured these preferences as SVO or closely related constructs (e.g., prosocial
values, other orientation, or collective orientation). Building on decomposed dictator
games, SVO offers a more fine-grained approach and has been shown to explain hetero-
geneity in individual behavior in public goods games (Balliet et al., 2009; Murphy and
Ackermann, 2014). SVO measures the relative importance of own and others’ payoffs
(McClintock and Allison, 1989). Typically, specific types (i.e., altruistic, cooperative,
competitive, and individualistic) are identified, which are in turn used to explain indi-
vidual heterogeneity in behavior formation. This way, it has been shown that prosocials
(i.e., cooperative or altruistic types) are more likely to cooperate in social dilemmas
than proselfs (i.e., individualistic or competitive types) (Abele et al., 2010; Balliet et al.,
2009; Bogaert et al., 2008). Albeit SVO has been shown to have a smaller effect in
step-level public goods compared to continuous public goods (Abele et al., 2010), we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10. Prosocial individuals contribute earlier in the contribution sequence.
Having described the hypotheses, we now turn to the laboratory design and procedures
before we report the results of our study.
3. Experimental Design
The experimental procedure consists of four parts: Upon arriving at the laboratory,
participants were randomly assigned to cubicles. Then, having been introduced to the
general procedures of the experiment, the public goods game was explained in detail by
using neutrally framed instructions.3 After that, participants were asked to answer four
control questions to ensure common understanding of the proceedings of the public
goods game. Arising questions were dealt with by the experimenter in private. The
next stage only started after all 24 participants in a session had managed to answer
all control questions correctly. After that, ten rounds of a public goods game using
3 A translated version of the full instructions can be found in Appendix C.
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7 High Provision Point Combined
the PPM under the real-time protocol were played. In our specific case, participants
faced a PPM as described above with n = 8, G = 3500 tokens, and c = 100 tokens.
After every round, groups were randomly rematched to mitigate reputation effects. To
make strategic behavior and end-of-period effects less pronounced, every round lasted
between 60 and 90 seconds with equal probability of termination in between, thus
leaving it unclear ex ante how long the round would exactly be. For similar reasons,
subjects were not told in advance that there would be exactly ten rounds. In each
round, investment decisions of each player in a group were made known to all others in
real time. Additionally, all subjects were informed that one round would be randomly
selected to become payoff-relevant at the end of the experiment.
To explore the causal effect of institutional changes on our variables of interest, we
used a 2x2 design altering the provision point, the level of information provided to
participants, and a combination of both. While the former could be either low or high
(i.e., t = 5 vs. t = 7), the latter could be either full or none (i.e., full but anonymized
feedback vs. no feedback).4 This yields the different combinations depicted in Table 1
to which subjects were randomly assigned.5
After having played ten rounds of the public goods game, two other behavioral measures
were employed. Specifically, participants’ SVO and risk attitudes were elicited. For
the former we used the slider-measure approach (Murphy et al., 2011) where each
participant has to indicate distributional preferences by allocating a given endowment
between herself and another person. In comparison to older measures of the construct,
4 We decided to use extreme cases instead of subtler changes to the institutional environment to
receive maximum treatment effects (List, 2011).
5 Due to administrative issues, we conducted twice as many sessions of the Baseline.
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this approach does not only yield behavioral types, but the SVO angle, a much more
fine-grained measure on a ratio scale. The participants faced 15 of such decomposed
games yielding a position on a circular plane of all possible allocation-based positions
and defining the SVO (see Murphy et al., 2011, for a detailed description).
Following the approach by Holt and Laury (2002), individual risk aversion was assessed
by having the participants choose between ten pairs of investment options A and B, one
having a greater payoff spread than the other. Basically, the measure allows to identify a
person’s risk aversion by observing the point at which an individual switches to choose
the riskier option B over option A. For example, a person is classified as risk-neutral
when choosing option A for the first four times and then switching to option B, because
then the expected payoff difference between option A and B turns negative for the first
time. In general, the earlier an individual chooses the riskier option B over option A,
the more risk seeking this person is. Again, participants were informed ex ante that one
decision would be randomly selected to determine payoff from this part.
As a last part, participants were asked to fill in several questionnaires. First, the Ger-
man version of the HEXACO-60 personality inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009; Moshagen
et al., 2014) was used. Additionally, besides risk aversion, several control variables were
elicited as collective behavior may also be influenced by other individual characteristics.
Specifically, the controls included participants’ gender and age, their study major, math
grade as crude proxy for general mental ability, and measures for generalized trust as
well as positive and negative reciprocity norms. While the former has been extensively
studied as an antecedent of cooperativeness (Ostrom and Walker, 2003), the latter are
also frequently mentioned, since they account for rather reactive forms of behavior
(Chaudhuri, 2011). For example, generalized forms of retaliation for past behavior of
anonymous others may also explain an individual’s behavior over time. These measures
deploy additional control for non-specific retaliation caused by general anger concern-
ing defection of others. For reasons of parsimony, these controls were measured using
three-item scales from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) (Caliendo et al., 2012;
Dohmen et al., 2008). Then, individual payoffs from all parts were determined and all
subjects received their payment in private.
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4. Results
The experiment was conducted at MELESSA, the experimental laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Munich, in September and October 2015. 360 participants recruited using Orsee
(Greiner, 2015) took part in 15 sessions which lasted about 75 minutes each. The aver-
age age of participants was 25.7 years; the youngest participant was 18 and the oldest
62 years old. The majority of participants was female (60%) and students (90%); 31%
pursued a major in business and economics. All sessions were computerized using the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). During the experiment, participants could earn ex-
perimental points that were exchanged into e at the end. On average, subjects earned
13.71 e, including a show-up fee of 4 e.
In the next section, we present our main results. Our findings are structured as follows:
First, we present descriptive results. We do so by describing our data set and investigat-
ing group-level outcomes before scrutinizing individual-level decisions, which are the
foundation for the macro-level outcomes described before. After that, we turn to test
our hypotheses. We start by looking at treatment effects of the institutional changes
described above. Then, we delineate whether we actually observe cascading in our
data as predicted and test which antecedents may be used to predict the position in the
behavioral sequence.
4.1. Descriptive Results
Information about the descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2, while individual
differences and intercorrelations across treatments are depicted in Table 6 and Table
7 in Appendix A, respectively. By and large, the patterns we find for our variables
correspond to those in the literature.
Personality was measured on a five-point scale with 60 items (i.e., six dimensions, ten
items each) of the established and validated HEXACO questionnaire (Moshagen et al.,
2014) to assess the extent to which respondents were honest (α = .76), emotionally
stable (α = .76), extraverted (α = .80), agreeable (α = .74), conscientious (α = .77),
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
Mean SD Min Max Alpha
Honesty 3.30 0.73 1 5 0.76
Emotionality 3.17 0.68 1 5 0.76
Extraversion 3.47 0.65 1 5 0.80
Agreeableness 3.13 0.63 1 5 0.74
Conscientiousness 3.74 0.61 1 5 0.77
Openness 3.64 0.62 2 5 0.69
SVO angle 17.18 12.73 -16 46 –
Risk aversion 6.38 1.52 0 10 –
Trust 3.20 0.90 1 5 0.74
Negative reciprocity 2.55 0.92 1 5 0.77
Positive reciprocity 4.43 0.57 1 5 0.61
and open to experience (α = .69). While there is some variation in internal consistency,
all alpha values are comparable to those reported by Moshagen et al. (2014).6 Figure 6
in Appendix A depicts the distribution of scores on the six HEXACO dimensions in our
sample.
Concerning SVOs, our results and distributions are comparable to those reported by
Murphy et al. (2011), who also indicated clustering around the individualistic type and
no representation of purely altruistic individuals. See Figure 7 in Appendix A for the
distribution of angles in our sample.
Regarding our control variables reciprocity, trust and risk aversion, patterns are also
quite similar to the literature. While positive reciprocity (α = .61) only has questionable
internal consistency, negative reciprocity (α = .77) and trust (α = .74) show accept-
able levels of internal consistency. Compared to Caliendo et al. (2012), who also report
questionable internal consistencies for negative and positive reciprocity and good inter-
nal consistency for trust, our results are in line considering the differences in sample
6 Furthermore, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate the underlying factor structure
of the HEXACO model. The results are described in Appendix B.
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size.7 As the internal consistency depends on the number of items used and considering
the fact that we include reciprocity and trust only as control variables, this is a caveat,
but should not limit the interpretation of our results in general.
Regarding risk preferences, the average participant in our sample is risk averse, while 40
participants showed either an inconsistent choice pattern (i.e., more than one switching
point) and/or failed to choose the higher monetary outcome when confronted with
a choice between 200 points and 385 points with probability one, respectively. As
excluding these subjects from our analyses does not change the results substantially and
risk preferences are a control rather than a variable of interest, we decided to include
all subject in our analysis.
Overall, the independent variables measured in our sample resemble those established
in the literature, encouraging use of all of the variables for further analysis.
4.1.1. Group-Level Outcomes
Before explicitly testing our hypotheses, we give a general description of the group-level
outcomes and how they are shaped by individual contribution decisions. We do so by
describing the implementation rates as well as the mean rate of optimal outcome across
all ten periods.
Figure 2 displays the rate of cases out of all group observations in each of the ten peri-
ods in which the public good was successfully implemented (solid line) across all four
treatments (i.e., at least five (seven) out of eight group members contributed their en-
dowment). It also contains the rate of cases in which the theoretically optimal outcome
(dashed line) was reached (i.e., exactly five (seven) out of eight group members con-
tributed). Note that due to the way these two measures are constructed, the mean rate
of optimal outcome is a proportion of the total mean implementation rate, which also
includes the cases in which six, seven or even all eight group members contributed.
These cases lead to the implementation of the public good as well, but to a lower total
7 A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to evaluate the factor structure (RMSEA = .049, SRMR
= .038, CFI = .987); model fit is acceptable (Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Brown, 2006).
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Notes: Figure depicts average rates of successful (public good provided) and optimal imple-
mentation (threshold reached exactly) by period. Calculations based on 450 groups.
payoff because the additional contributions are lost. Thus, the upper limit for the mean
rate of optimal outcome is given by the mean implementation rate.
Overall, it is evident that in our setting, the mean implementation rate is quite high. This
rate of successful public good provision is substantially larger than in other experiments
using the PPM (e.g., Croson and Marks, 2000). This indicates that the real-time pro-
tocol sustains cooperativeness in socially complex settings. In general, implementation
does not seem to become more unlikely over the course of the experiment. Moreover,
most of the participants seem determined to contribute in the first period, resulting in
implementation in all groups, but also in a very low proportion of groups with exactly
five (seven) individuals contributing (i.e., the optimal solution). In the Baseline, im-
plementation rates stay high at all times, while the number of groups that manage to
coordinate efficiently increases. Judging by the graphs alone, differences in availabil-
ity of information about contribution decisions of others seem to have little influence
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on the groups’ ability to effectively coordinate for collective success as long as the step
return remains constant (Baseline → No Info). In comparison, only manipulating the
step return seems to affect collective success more strongly (Baseline → High Provi-
sion Point), as these groups’ average implementation rate across all rounds is lower.
When stakes are high for the groups, unavailability of information has a strong effect
on their ability to effectively coordinate for collective success (High Provision Point →
Combined). Moreover, the groups’ coordination ability drops dramatically when simulta-
neously confronted with a lower step return and unavailability of information (Baseline
→ Combined). Although there is some variation over periods, the only treatment with a
clear decline over time is Combined.
While there is more variation in No Info compared to the Baseline, there are still some
groups in the Baseline with excess contributions although subjects should know that they
burn money. To check whether subjects were behaving irrationally, we take a closer look
at seemingly irrational contributions in the Baseline and High Provision Point treatments,
where subjects receive real-time information about whether there are enough contribu-
tions for the provision point to be reached. Out of 1510 observations in the two relevant
treatments, 84 are seemingly irrational (i.e., it was visible there were already enough
contributions for the public good to be implemented), which is a percentage of 5.5%. Of
these contributions, 56 were made more than one second after the provision point was
reached. Thus, only 3.7% of contribution decisions were not in accordance with stan-
dard assumptions. In light of the fact that this is only a very small fraction of choices
and that one could possibly rationalize these choices when non-standard preferences
like inequity aversion are considered, we use all observations for our analysis.
4.1.2. Individual Contributions
Figure 3 depicts the average number of contributors for each treatment across the ten
periods. Notably, albeit the number of contributors fluctuates, it is quite high in general.
While the average number of contributors slightly decreases over time across all treat-
ments, this does not automatically indicate a negative trend of collective success. For
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instance, in the Baseline treatment, the high average number of contributors in the be-
ginning (rounds one to three) drops to converge around the optimal rate of contributors
indicated by the dotted line. In addition, the graph provides some suggestive evidence
that only in the Combined treatment the number of contributors strongly decreases be-
low the provision point over time.
Having given a first impression of what our data look like, we now turn to test our
hypotheses in the next paragraph.
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Mean number of contributors
Notes: Figure depicts average number of contributions made by period. Dashed line indi-
cates threshold. Calculations based on 360 subjects.
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4.2. Test of Hypotheses
4.2.1. Institutional Changes
We now investigate differences in implementation of the public good across the different
treatment conditions described above. While overall average implementation rates are
quite high in all treatments except for Combined (Baseline: 88%; No Info: 84%; High
Provision Point: 77%; Combined: 27%), the patterns described above and depicted in
Figure 3 already provide suggestive evidence for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
The general impressions regarding the group-level success trajectories are supported by
Fisher exact tests comparing the mean implementation rates of the public good across
treatments. In particular, we find significant differences between all treatments ex-
cept for the comparison between the Baseline and No Info treatments. In particular,
the differences between Combined and all other conditions are highly significant (p <
0.001). The difference between the Baseline and the High Provision Point treatments is
significant as well (p = 0.022), while the Fisher exact test fails to detect a significant
difference between the Baseline and No Info (p = 0.453). In addition, we ran a probit
regression predicting implementation success at the group level by provision point and
availability of information. Details can be found in Table 8 in Appendix A. The results
mirror the Fisher exact tests: while a high provision point significantly decreases im-
plementation success, the coefficient for lack of real-time information is negative, but
insignificant. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 1 but not for Hypothesis 2. How-
ever, we find a negative and significant interaction effect, indicating that the interplay
of a high provision point and no information leads to an additional decrease in imple-
mentation success. Summing up, we find that lowering the step return leads to lower
implementation rates, while removing information about what the other group mem-
bers do does not. In addition, the combination of a lack of information and a high
provision point also significantly reduces implementation rates.
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4.2.2. Explaining Endogenous Contribution Sequences
In Hypothesis 3, we posited that removing information about group member’s behavior
would decrease individual decision timing. In principle, the coordination problem with
the real-time protocol allows for the groups to exhibit different behavioral trajectories
at the individual level, which then may or may not cause similar levels of collective
success. Therefore, in Figure 4, we graphically explore individual decision timing.
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Notes: Figure depicts the distribution of time in the period when a contribution was made.
Calculations based on 2,470 observations.
Some features are especially noteworthy when comparing the distribution of individual
decision timing between the treatments with and without available information (i.e.,
Baseline and High Provision Point vs. No Info and Combined). In the treatments with-
out information (No Info and Combined), almost all of the contributions happen within
the first 20 seconds. In the other two treatments (Baseline and High Provision Point),
the underlying pattern is different. In the latter case, a bimodal distribution of individ-
ual decision timing unfolds. Two moderate peaks distinguish very early contributions
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and those made around 60 seconds, which marks the earliest time where each round
could possibly be over according to our design. To explore this further, we compare
the average time to contribute using Mann-Whitney U tests. While there is a significant
difference between the treatments with and without information about others’ behavior
(Baseline vs. No Info: z = 2.32, p = 0.02; High Provision Point vs. Combined: z =
1.96, p = 0.05), this is not the case between the respective treatments with a low and
high provision point (Baseline vs. High Provision Point: z = -0.26, p = 0.80; No Info vs.
Combined: z = -0.66, p = 0.51).
In addition, to get at the difference in distributions between the contribution patterns,
we compare the cumulative distributions of contribution times depending on whether
information on others’ decision is available or not. Figure 5 depicts the two functions.
It is evident that the cumulative distribution function of times to contribute with infor-
mation first-order stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution function without
information. Summing up, we find support for Hypothesis 3.
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Notes: Figure depicts cumulative distribution functions of contribution times for treatments
with information (dark line) and without information (light line). Calculations based on
2,470 observations.
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In Hypothesis 4, we claimed that there is non-random variation with regard to the se-
quence of decision timing. As explained above, the central notion of threshold models
is that one’s own contribution depends on the number of active others. For our setting,
this implies that there is actually a contribution sequence observable rather than most
contribution decisions being made more or less simultaneously right after the start of
the period. Thus, for the threshold model to be applicable to our setting, we should
observe sufficient variation in the timing of contributions within each round. To explore
this, focus on the left side of Figure 4. As already stated above, contributions are spread
over the whole period, with two peaks at the beginning of the period as well as around
second 60, which marks the boundary between the first minute in which there is still
time to contribute and the last 30 seconds in which the round is possibly terminated.
The mean time to contribute across all periods is 24.52 seconds with a standard devi-
ation of 23.26 seconds. This shows that we find considerable variation in contribution
timing, which is also consistent with the assumption of behavioral heterogeneity in the
threshold theory of collective behavior (Granovetter and Soong, 1983). Summing up,
contributions are indeed made sequentially when real-time information about others’
contributions is available, providing the prerequisite for the analysis of antecedents for
decision timing.
To subsequently test the rest of our hypotheses, we estimated the effects of personality
and SVO on contribution decisions and contribution order in a regression framework.
The individual behavioral threshold, our main dependent variable, was created follow-
ing Granovetter (1978). We measure an individual’s behavioral threshold “[. . . ] by
the exact number of others who have made a decision before he does” (Granovetter,
1978, p.1440). Thus, for each round, an individual-level variable (obsCon) was cre-
ated, which represents the number of other group member’s contributions to the public
account before the respective individual contributed him- or herself. For example, be-
fore making a contribution, a random individual may have observed nobody in the first
round, two contributions in the second round, four contributions in the third round and
so on. This individual’s values of obsCon would then be 0, 2, and 4, respectively. Thus,
each individual can have a maximum of 10 values for obsCon over the course of each
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session, which can range from 0 to 7 within each round, as all groups contain exactly
eight participants. As this procedure only yields values for cases in which individuals
actually contributed to the public good, our analyses are limited to those cases. When
conducting our analyses, we generally controlled for risk aversion, trust, reciprocal in-
clinations, and several socioeconomic factors.8 In addition, we included period fixed
effects to capture time trends and overall learning in our regressions.
As a benchmark, we start by regressing a binary variable indicating whether an individ-
ual made a contribution or not on our variables of interest and set of controls. Table 3
reports the model using the whole sample including treatment indicators in column (1)
as well as separate regressions for each of the four treatments in columns (2) to (5).
Here, it can be seen that an individual’s SVO angle significantly increases the probabil-
ity to make a contribution to the public account, while the HEXACO dimensions turn
out to be non-significant predictors for contribution propensity. Thus, distal personality
measures do not influence contribution decisions on the extensive margin in our setting.
However, as we are primarily interested in the intensive margin, that is, how personality
factors influence contribution order, this is not discouraging per se.
Next, we turn to the exploration of antecedents of contribution order. As obsCon can
take eight possible values, but is an ordinal variable, we employ a panel ordered probit
approach. As with contribution decisions, we report an estimation using all observa-
tions and including an indicator variable for the provision point as well as separate
estimations for the Baseline and High Provision Point treatments. The estimation re-
sults for all specifications are summarized in Table 4. Looking at the overall model in
column (1), four predictors turn out to be significant: The treatment indicator is signifi-
cant by design. As predicted, a larger SVO angle, that is, a more prosocial orientation, is
associated with earlier contributions. Interestingly, while the coefficients for both agree-
ableness and honesty-humility turn out to be insignificant, two other HEXACO person-
ality dimensions are significant predictors for contribution sequence: while extraversion
and the number of observed contributions are significantly negatively related, meaning
that individuals with higher extraversion scores contribute earlier, conscientiousness
8 These include gender, age, subject of study, and general mental ability proxied by math grade.
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Table 3: Panel probit regressions for contribution decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Openness 6.55e-05 -0.0250 -0.00156 0.0460 -0.0149
(0.0268) (0.0436) (0.0479) (0.0588) (0.0525)
Conscientiousness -0.0374 -0.0358 0.00419 -0.0646 -0.0539
(0.0252) (0.0348) (0.0497) (0.0602) (0.0555)
Agreeableness 0.000234 -0.00553 0.00630 0.0215 0.0372
(0.0275) (0.0450) (0.0569) (0.0643) (0.0603)
Extraversion 0.00903 0.0247 0.00263 -0.0333 -0.0217
(0.0246) (0.0383) (0.0484) (0.0561) (0.0604)
Emotionality 0.0136 -0.0248 -0.0109 0.107** 0.0158
(0.0254) (0.0366) (0.0551) (0.0532) (0.0595)
Honesty 0.0132 0.0718** -0.0119 0.0240 0.0399
(0.0238) (0.0354) (0.0487) (0.0634) (0.0424)
SVO angle 0.00523*** 0.00603*** -0.000656 0.00544* 0.00717***
(0.00114) (0.00175) (0.00225) (0.00299) (0.00273)
High PP = 1 0.0508*
(0.0285)
No Info = 1 -0.0197
(0.0309)
High PP -0.191***
# No Info (0.0616)
Observations 3,600 1,440 720 720 720
Groups 360 144 72 72 72
Wald Chi2 139.1 75.31 45.14 57.12 103
Notes: The table reports marginal effects after panel probit regressions. Controls include
trust, positive and negative reciprocity, risk aversion, gender, age, subject of study, mental
ability, and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Panel ordered probit regressions for contribution order
(1) (2) (3)
DV: obsCon Overall Baseline
High Pro-
vision Point
Openness 0.0581 0.00525 0.155
(0.118) (0.143) (0.214)
Conscientiousness 0.261*** 0.306*** 0.221
(0.0998) (0.117) (0.203)
Agreeableness -0.103 -0.0805 -0.0701
(0.123) (0.131) (0.229)
Extraversion -0.217** -0.345*** -0.0414
(0.109) (0.126) (0.186)
Emotionality 0.0687 0.0560 0.116
(0.0986) (0.111) (0.207)
Honesty -0.123 -0.281** -0.00172
(0.107) (0.139) (0.197)
SVO angle -0.0198*** -0.0243*** -0.0152*
(0.00505) (0.00595) (0.00900)
High PP = 1 0.527***
(0.151)
Observations 1,510 937 573
Subjects 214 142 72
Wald Chi2 60.82 53.39 47.23
Notes: Table shows raw coefficients after panel ordered probit regressions. While all rele-
vant observations are used in column (1), estimation in column (2) uses Baseline treatment
observations only, and column (3) uses High Provision Point Treatment observations only.
Controls include trust, positive and negative reciprocity, gender, age, subject of study, men-
tal ability, and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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has a positive impact, meaning that individuals with higher conscientiousness scores
contribute later in the sequence. Thus, the estimation results partially support our hy-
potheses: while we find support for Hypotheses 7, 9 and, 10, the rest (Hypotheses 5,
6, and 8) cannot be supported. Hence, in our sample, more prosocial individuals are
more likely to contribute earlier, indicating lower behavioral thresholds. With respect
to the more distal personality traits, emotionality as well as honesty and agreeable-
ness have no impact on contribution behavior. However, we find that extraversion and
conscientiousness influence the propensity to contribute early.
4.3. A Closer Look at Behavioral Types
Finally, we take a closer look at different behavioral types to gain further insights into
what might determine contribution behavior in our setting.
First, we rerun our main analysis of contribution order, but exclude all pivotal con-
tributions, because these contributions are strategically fundamentally different from
the others as unlike for every contribution before that, there is no uncertainty about
whether the provision point is going to be reached or not – if the pivotal contribution
is made, the public good is going to be implemented for sure. The results are pre-
sented in column (1) of Table 5, revealing a similar pattern to the analysis comprising
all contribution decisions without accounting for their distinct strategic nature. Again,
the coefficients for SVO angle and extraversion are significantly negative, while the co-
efficient for conscientiousness is significantly positive. Hence, even when only looking
at contributions under uncertain conditions, we still find that individuals with a more
prosocial attitude and more extraverted individuals contribute earlier in the sequence,
while more conscientious individuals contribute later.
Next, we take a closer look at pivotal contributions only, following the rationale ex-
plained above. More specifically, we compare all non-pivotal contributions to those that
directly lead to implementation of the public good using a probit regression. As can be
seen in column (2) of Table 5, the propensity of making a pivotal rather than another
contribution is significantly increasing in the degree of conscientiousness of decision
29
CONTRIBUTION SEQUENCES IN THRESHOLD PUBLIC GOODS





Openness 0.0521 0.0190 -0.0247
(0.123) (0.0255) (0.0299)
Conscientiousness 0.182* 0.0581** -0.0626***
(0.101) (0.0227) (0.0243)
Agreeableness -0.0723 -0.0209 0.0201
(0.124) (0.0277) (0.0313)
Extraversion -0.184* -0.0163 0.0383
(0.109) (0.0236) (0.0244)
Emotionality 0.153 0.000157 -0.0495*
(0.0948) (0.0250) (0.0258)
Honesty -0.00538 -0.0289 0.0108
(0.108) (0.0254) (0.0262)
SVO angle -0.0148*** -0.00412*** 0.00344***
(0.00497) (0.00114) (0.00109)
High PP = 1 0.758*** -0.0316 -0.0207
(0.158) (0.0295) (0.0344)
Observations 1,193 1,510 1,510
Number of Subjects 200 214 214
Wald Chi2 56.11 37.15 26.75
Notes: Column (1) shows raw coefficients after panel ordered probit regression, while
columns (2) and (3) depict marginal effects after panel probit regressions. Controls in-
clude trust, positive and negative reciprocity, gender, age, subject of study, mental ability,
and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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makers, while it is significantly decreasing in SVO angle. Thus, more conscientious and
less prosocial individuals are more likely to make pivotal instead of uncertain contribu-
tions to the public account.
In addition, we also explore which factors influence the decision to make the first move
in the group, that is, to contribute before anyone else does. As expected, the coefficients
for SVO angle and conscientiousness depicted in column (3) of Table 5 mirror those for
the other obsCon regressions, indicating that individuals with a higher prosocial attitude
and lower conscientiousness are more likely to be first movers. Surprisingly, however,
the coefficient of emotionality is also significant and negative, indicating that higher
scores in emotional stability decrease the propensity to make the first move.
5. Discussion
Summing up, our laboratory experiment yields some interesting insights. First, while
implementation success is higher when the provision point is lower, i.e., only five rather
than seven contributing individuals are needed for the public good to be implemented,
availability of real-time information about others’ behavior does not automatically fa-
cilitate efficient coordination and implementation success. While this is somewhat sur-
prising in light of our hypotheses, it is also in line with what has been reported in the
literature in slightly different settings. A specific explanation in our setting might be a
possible ceiling effect: As compared to the literature our implementation rates are very
high, especially when the provision point is set at five contributions. Consequently, the
relatively easy goal of finding these five individuals implies that real-time information
cannot make a big difference in facilitating implementation success. However, we do
find that the combination of a high provision point and a lack of availability of real-time
information leads to a steep decrease in group success. Thus, overall, our results reveal
that the institutional environment matters for group outcomes.
Furthermore, our experiment shows that the coordination problem our subjects face
leads to contribution sequences as predicted by threshold theory. While some subjects
are instigators and actively contribute very early, moderates wait for some collective
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movement to begin, while again others are quite reluctant and need to see a lot of other
individuals contribute before contributing themselves. Furthermore, our results show
that while participation in collective action can be predicted by SVO alone, the sequenc-
ing is influenced by a broader array of individual differences (i.e., conscientiousness,
extraversion, and SVO). Yet, not all of these individual differences affect behavioral
thresholds in the same direction: while extraversion and SVO further individual proac-
tivity, conscientiousness hinders it.
However, the results concerning emotionality, agreeableness, and honesty are somewhat
surprising in light of our hypotheses. While both the theoretical rationale as well as the
empirical results regarding the VCM were convincing ex ante, their applicability under
the PPM seems to be limited. Albeit agreeableness is conceptualized as a rather reactive
trait domain, the context may have suppressed this effect. Moreover, our setting does
not provide extensive possibility to show strong reactions, such as direct punishment of
others or retaliation in future sessions. It might be the case that our treatment interven-
tions were strong enough to override the behavioral tendencies due to distal individual
heterogeneity in personality structure. In contrast to the standard trait-based approach,
other scholars in psychology have been in favor of more complex person-situation in-
teractions (Hough et al., 2015; Mischel and Shoda, 1995, 2010; Schein, 2015). Using
the concept of situational strength, it has been argued that cues provided by the envi-
ronment heavily influence behavior formation (Dalal et al., 2015; Judge and Zapata,
2015). While in strong situations, personality has only a modest influence on overt be-
havior, in weak situations which are unstructured, without salient, or very ambiguous
cues, personality plays a much stronger role (Meyer et al., 2010). This could be the rea-
son why agreeableness cannot explain additional variation in our experimental setting.
A somewhat similar argument can be made for emotionality and honesty. While we
are not able to discern an emotionality and agreeableness effect at all, it is interesting
that the effect of honesty is at least visible in the Baseline of our setting, suggesting an
interaction of situation and personality.
However, our results have to be seen in the light of some limitations that offer vari-
ous opportunities for future research. First, the advantage of controlling for situational
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influences in laboratory settings naturally comes at a cost. Random rematching and
irrevocable decisions rule out within-group learning, coalition building, and retalia-
tion. Future research may use the real-time protocol including revocable commitments
(Goren et al., 2004) in order to extend our results to these decision processes. Second,
we investigate behavior formation when individuals are confronted with all-or-nothing
contribution decisions. Thus, our results are limited to the basic decision of supporting
a project or task by exerting costly effort at all or not. In addition, various forms of
teamwork are characterized by a continuous contribution to the public good, which our
design does not capture. Third, our design does not include heterogeneity of players
with regard to network centrality. It has been reported in the literature on network
effects that bandwagon dynamics can be severely impacted if individual contributions
of central peers in their respective network have larger impact than more distal play-
ers (Chiang, 2007). Fourth, some of our analyses and consequently our implications
are based exclusively on those individuals who contributed to the public good. This
limitation is becaue albeit we are able to tell that the respective behavioral threshold
of individuals choosing not to contribute was not reached, we cannot infer what their
exact behavioral threshold would have been. Fifth, while we take into account that per-
sonality is a more useful explanation of behavior in weak situations than in strong situ-
ations, our treatments may interfere with the situational strength of the social dilemma.
Future studies may directly compare group behavior with weak and strong situational
cues and interact it with the group’s personality mix (e.g., ratio of prosocials). Sixth,
future studies may take a closer look at self-selection of individuals into the respective
situational contexts. The usage of self-selection rather than authority as a means to al-
locate tasks throughout the firm has been argued to be one of the true novelties of new
forms of organizing (Puranam et al., 2014). In order to build implications for practice,
it would be interesting to know if individual differences yield substantial differences for
self-selection. Subsequently, the performance implications of sorting may be analyzed
by comparing self-selected to exogenously selected groups. According to the attraction-
selection-attrition framework (Scheider, 1987) or the person-organization-fit literature
(Kristof, 1996), selection into (and out of) organizations is not a random process. Thus,
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employee self-selection may severely limit an organization’s ability to staff task forces
or project teams with the individuals prone to take lead in contribution sequences. As
Bridoux et al. (2011) point out, a given mix of motives demands for a differential and
nuanced approach regarding the motivational system that needs to be employed to yield
maximum contributions. Finally, our study investigates the general causal effect of insti-
tutional manipulations on contribution behavior. However, we cannot tackle the exact
mechanism responsible for collective results at the individual level. According to Za-
far (2011), the general effect of manipulating information about others’ behaviors may
be due to individuals trying to infer the best choice (social learning), actually gaining
utility from acting alike (social comparison), or wanting to gain a positive self-concept
(social image).
6. Conclusion
The findings of this experiment suggest interesting implications for theory development,
practitioners and future research. For practitioners and applied scholars, it is notewor-
thy that institutional factors eminent to the environment or malleable by the individual
manager matter a great deal towards success and efficiency of project teams or strategic
initiatives. It has been shown by the results of our experiment that information provi-
sion about group member’s behavior can significantly facilitate coordination. What is
more, our results support the basic rationale of the threshold model of collective be-
havior. In fact, individuals show substantial heterogeneity in threshold formation when
confronted with the production of a provision point public good with endogenous deci-
sion timing. More importantly, our study provides empirical support for the anecdotal
argument that this heterogeneity may, in part, be caused by individual differences. Fur-
thermore, our study generally supports the notion that heterogeneous motives matter in
the context of collective behavior formation. Given the fact that coordination has been
deemed as one of the central tasks of any organization (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009;
Puranam et al., 2014), those mechanisms should be tested under real organizational
conditions using for example field experiments or insider econometric studies.
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Gender 0.66 0.56 0.50 0.61 5.75
(0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Age 26.78 23.82 25.36 25.71 5.85
(8.56) (3.73) (3.84) (6.61)
Student 0.85 0.93 0.96 0.89 6.73*
(0.35) (0.26) (0.20) (0.32)
Openness 3.70 3.62 3.54 3.65 4.87
(0.64) (0.60) (0.52) (0.70)
Conscientiousness 3.77 3.69 3.74 3.74 1.83
(0.63) (0.58) (0.57) (0.65)
Agreeableness 3.07 3.16 3.30 3.06 7.23*
(0.62) (0.68) (0.55) (0.65)
Extraversion 3.45 3.48 3.56 3.41 1.89
(0.68) (0.66) (0.59) (0.67)
Emotionality 3.21 3.15 3.10 3.20 2.95
(0.74) (0.65) (0.58) (0.65)
Honesty 3.25 3.33 3.37 3.31 0.80
(0.75) (0.71) (0.64) (0.79)
SVO angle 16.39 17.87 19.28 15.95 3.78
(12.83) (12.99) (12.17) (12.77)
Risk aversion 6.52 6.49 6.38 5.99 5.26
(1.56) (1.40) (1.44) (1.60)
Trust 3.07 3.25 3.31 3.30 5.82
(0.88) (0.93) (0.88) (0.91)
Negative reciprocity 2.57 2.51 2.54 2.56 0.13
(0.96) (0.84) (0.90) (0.98)
Positive reciprocity 4.40 4.44 4.44 4.46 2.33
(0.52) (0.56) (0.64) (0.61)
Observations 144 72 72 72
Notes: Table reports variable means by treatment. Standard deviations are reported in
parentheses. Column "Chi2" reports Kruskal Wallis test statistics / Chi2 test statistics for









































Table 7: Pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables
OP CO AG EX EM HH SVO Risk Trust Neg.
CO 0.059
AG 0.115∗ -0.065
EX 0.256∗∗∗ 0.089 0.199∗∗∗
EM -0.024 0.064 -0.112∗ -0.199∗∗∗
HH 0.169∗∗ 0.029 0.257∗∗∗ 0.096 0.175∗∗∗
SVO 0.077 0.014 0.050 0.019 0.105∗ 0.221∗∗∗
Risk 0.044 -0.009 -0.136∗∗ -0.040 0.107∗ 0.066 -0.008
Trust 0.215∗∗∗ -0.112∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ -0.096 0.240∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ -0.105∗
Neg. -0.174∗∗∗ -0.100 -0.421∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.459∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ 0.112∗ -0.335∗∗∗
Pos. 0.219∗∗∗ 0.074 0.180∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.062 0.183∗∗∗ 0.072 0.003 0.188∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗
Notes: Table depicts pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables. Abbreviations: OP = Openness to experience, AG
= Agreeableness, EX = Extraversion, EM = Emotionality, HH = Honesty-humility, SVO = Social value orientation, Risk = Risk
aversion, Neg. = Negative reciprocity, Pos. = Positive reciprocity. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3
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Table 8: Implementation success dependent on treatment condition
DV: implementation success (1)
High PP = 1 -0.459**
(0.197)
No Info = 1 -0.151
(0.206)




Notes: Table shows coefficients after probit regression of implementation success on indi-
cators for institutional conditions on the group level. Controls include period fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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B. Factor Analysis
Albeit the root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] of .060 as well as the
standardized root mean residual [SRMR] of .080 indicated an acceptable model fit, the
comparative fit index [CFI] of .594 is fairly low, which can be troublesome (Bentler and
Bonett, 1980; Brown, 2006). This finding, however, is not unique to our setting, but has
been reported for other measures of personality like the five-factor model. As a conse-
quence, the usefulness of CFA to assess the factor structure of personality measures has
been questioned (Hopwood and Donnellan, 2010; McCrae et al., 1996; Oswald et al.,
2013; Raykov, 1998). However, as a six-factor model yielded significantly better fit than
a one-factor model (∆χ2 = 2041.12, p < .01), we decided to follow the approach sug-
gested by Ashton and Lee (2009) and conducted an item-level factor analysis applying
principal axis extraction with varimax rotation of six factors. The eigenvalues of the
first eight factors derived from the 60 items exceeded the value of 1 and specifically
were 5.14, 3.81, 3.43, 2.58, 1.98, 1.84, 1.39, and 1.13. There is suggestive evidence
for a six-factor solution, as the eigenvalue decreased rather sharply from 1.84 for fac-
tor six to 1.39 for factor seven. A varimax rotation ensured that item loadings of all
items were primarily on the factor defined by the other items of the respective scale and
revealed that the primary item loadings replicated the basic structure of the HEXACO
model. Regarding individual factor loadings, one item showed a slightly higher loading
on a different factor than proposed by the manual. This was “I worry a lot less than
most people do”, which loaded higher on conscientiousness than on emotional stabil-
ity. Apart from item 19, 37, and 49 connected to the openness dimension, and item 5
connected to emotional stability, all primary loadings exceeded the value of .30. As this
is in line with what has been found in research on HEXACO personality in general and
average scores, standard deviations and interrelations between dimensions are compa-
rable to those reported by Moshagen et al. (2014), we decided to keep the original item
structure.
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C. Instructions
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation!
Please do not speak with the other participants from now on. Please remain silent
throughout the course of the experiment.
This experiment is designed to evaluate economic decision-making behavior. You will
be able to earn money which will be paid to you after the experiment privately and in
cash.
The entire experiment will last for about 70 minutes and consists of 3 parts. At the
beginning of each part you will receive detailed instructions. The parts of the experi-
ment are independent of each other, i.e., decisions in one part do not have any impact
on your earnings in the other parts. The sum of your earnings from all parts will be
added to your total earnings in this experiment. The total earnings will be paid to you
upon completion of the final part, individually and in cash. If there are any questions
concerning the instructions or during the experiment, press the red button on your key-
board (F11). One of the experimenter will come to you and answer your questions in
private. During the experiment, you will be asked to make several decisions. Some of
them will be made in interaction with other participants. This means that both your
own decisions and those of the other participants may determine your payoffs.
Payoff During the course of the experiment, payoffs are calculated not in Euros, but
in Experiment Points (EP). At the end of the experiment, the sum of your earned EP will
be converted to Euros. Here, the following exchange rate applies: 100 EP = 1 e.
In addition to the income that you can earn during the experiment, you receive 4 e
for your punctuality and 0.50 e for each page of the questionnaire at the end of the
experiment.
Anonymity None of the other participants will be able to observe your choices in this
experiment. In addition, the data from the experiment will be evaluated anonymously.
At the end of the experiment, you have to sign a receipt for the income you have earned
during this experiment. This is only due to accounting issues and cannot be used to as-
sociate your personal information with your decisions. Your name cannot be combined
with your behavior in the experiment at any time.
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Rounds Part 1 consists of a number of mutually independent rounds. In each round,
you have between 60 and 90 seconds to make your decision. Each round lasts at least
60 seconds; after this the end of the round is equally likely at any second. A clock will
inform you on elapsed time during the first 60 seconds.
Groups In each round, you form a group with seven other participants. The allocation
to those groups is random. The groups are dissolved after the end of each round and
re-formed randomly. None of the participants will be informed about the identity of the
other members of her group.
Decision Task At the beginning of each round, each of the eight members of a group
receives an initial endowment of 100 points. During the course of the round each
participant can decide freely to keep this amount in her personal account, or to invest
it in the group account. As soon as at least five of the eight members of the group have
decided to invest their initial endowment in the group account, the investment pays off
and grants a profit of 2800 points, which is distributed evenly across all eight members
of the group. If fewer than five group members have decided to invest until the end of
the round, the investment does not pay off. In this case, the investments in the group
account are lost. Each group member then receives only the points from her private
account.
During each round, every group member can anonymously follow the decisions of all
other group members on the screen.
Earnings You can decide in each round if you want to invest your initial endowment
in the group account. This decision you can make at any time the current round by
selecting your contribution and click "OK". If you choose to keep your initial endowment
and not to invest in the public account, there are two possible results:
• If at least five of the eight members of the group have decided to invest their initial
endowment in the group account, in addition to your initial endowment you will
receive one eighth of the profit of 2800 points. Overall, your payoff in this case
equals 100 + 2800 ÷ 8 = 450 points.
• If by the end of the round fewer than five group members have decided to invest
their initial endowment in the group account, all you get is your initial endowment
of 100 points. If you decide to invest your initial endowment, there are also two
possible outcomes:
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• If at least five of the eight members of your group have decided to invest their
initial endowment in the group account, you will receive one eighth of the profit
of 2800 points. Overall, your payoff in this case equals 2800 ÷ 8 = 350 points.
• If by the end of the round fewer than five group members have decided to invest
their initial endowment in the group account, you do not earn anything in this
round.
At the end of the experiment, one of the rounds you played will be randomly selected
and paid out.
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